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authority could not discriminate arbitrarily against existing tenants
in their right to continue occupancy. Finally, in Edwards, (employing the constitutional arguments of Judge Wright's opinion,
without having to resort to his discussion of statutory construction)
the prevention of public retaliatory evictions may be extended to the
private sector under the Shelley doctrine. Therefore, the action instituted by the landlord to evict the tenant must not hinder her constitutionally protected right to petition the government for griev25
ances.
Possibly, this decision will seriously hamper the rights of the
landlord in private action. How far it will extend is difficult to
predict. However, under present holdings, the right of the individual
to seek redress for his grievances is a fundamental first amendment
right which outweighs the right of a retaliating landlord to evict
tenants. This decision concerns only one of the many options open
to a property owner. Property may be leased, sold, rented, built
upon, or used for any legal purpose. The holding of this case concerns only rental property; therefore, in reality, the change may not
be as drastic as it may first seem. Notwithstanding the protection
afforded by this case, the landlord may resort to other effective
means of retaliation-the raising of rent or subsequent evictions
of the tenant for trivial violations of skillfully written leases. Nonetheless, the holding in the Edwards' case, at least to some degree,
allows the tenant to strive for better housing conditions without the
fear of eviction for his actions.
Hugh C. Avis
John Watson Coofler

Gift Taxes-Valuation of Right to Income Under §2503(b)
In 1961, Leonard Rosen and his brother Julius created separate
trusts for their children consisting of several thousand shares of
Gulf American common stock. The entire net income of each trust
was payable to the named beneficiary no less frequently than
annually. The corpus of the Leonard Rosen trust was to be distributed to each beneficiary in two payments upon the beneficiaries
reaching the ages of twenty-five and thirty years. The corpus of
the Julius Rosen trust was to be distributed in three installments to
25
Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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the beneficiaries upon attaining the age of 25, 30, and 35. Provisions
were made in each trust for gifts over in the event of the death of
any of the beneficiaries prior to distribution. The trust instruments
also provided that the trustees of each trust should have the power
to sell the Gulf American shares and re-invest the proceeds in nonincome or income producing property. They did not, however, have
the power to invade the corpus for any purpose.
In the years 1962 and 1963, the Rosens made further gifts of
Gulf American shares to the trusts established by them in 1961. Taxpayers then claimed gift tax exclusions for 1961, 1962, and 1963 for
the "income interests" of the shares of Gulf American basing their
claims on section 2503(b) of the Internal Revenue Code.
Since Gulf American had retained all its earning for growth
purposes and since no dividends had ever been paid on the shares
constituting the trust, the taxpayers valued the income interests by
applying the actuarial factors in table I, column 3 of section
25.2512(f) of the gift tax regulations. The parties agreed that the
gift of the corpus in each trust was a gift of a future interest but,
the government, while stipulating that the income interests donated
were present interests, nevertheless insisted that the exclusion was not
available since the interest had no ascertainable value. The Tax
Court held the government's contention and the taxpayers appealed
Held, reversed. Since the government conceded that a valuable
right was donated, it is inconsistent to contend that the right is
valueless for tax purposes. While the value of the income interests
donated here is not one which is easily ascertainable, the use of
actuarial tables to determine the value of such an interest is not
unrealistic or unreasonable. Rosen v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 245
(4th Cir. 1968).
Section 2503(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides
for a gift tax exclusion of the first $3,000 of the value of gifts of
property other than future interests.' In order for the donor to be
eligible for the exclusion, however, the gift must be completed.
That is to say, the donor must relinquish all dominion and control
'"In the case of gifts (other than gifts of future interests in property)
made to any person by the donor during the calendar year 1955 and subsequent calendar years, the first $3,000 of such gifts to such person shall not,
for purpose of subsection (a), be included in the total amount of gifts
made.... INT. REv. CODE of 1954 § 2503(b).
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and there must be a transfer with donative intent.2 Moreover, the
interest donated must be a present interest in order to qualify for
the exclusion. 3
In the Rosen case, there was a completed gift in trust of both
future and present interests.' The Rosens claimed exclusions for the
income interests donated and the government conceded and stipulated
that the income interest in each trust was a present interest.'
Nevertheless, the Tax Court took the view that since there had
never been income in the past, there would never be any in the
future and therefore that the donated income interests "were as
illusory as a million-dollar bequest in a pauper's will."6 It was this
line of reasoning which was repudiated by the court of appeals.7
The court of appeals pointed out that it is inconsistent to concede
that a valuable right has been donated and then contend that the
gift is valueless for tax purposes.' Recognition of this inconsistency
in the trial court's reasoning is much more important than it appears
at first glance. Implicit in the court of appeals' discussion on this
point is the severability of the tests of valuation and whether or not
a future interest has been donated.9 The specific question presented
in Rosen, then, was not whether the income interests donated by
the Rosens were present interests since the government had so
2 Talge

v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 836 (W.D. Mo. 1964).
3A present interest is an interest generally vesting in possession or enjoyment at the completion of the gift. A future interest is limited to commence in enjoyment or possession in the future. See Commissioner v. Disston,
325 U.S. 442 (1945).
4Rosen v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 245, 246 (4th Cir. 1968).
5
Id. at 247. It had previously been held that where the trust income is
required to be paid at least annually and where the distribution of the
corpus of the trust is deferred, the gift of the corpus is a future interest and
the gift of the present income is a present interest. Fondren v. Commissioner,
324 U.S. 18, 21 (1945).
6 See. Rosen v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 834, 847 (1967).
7
Rosen v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 245, 247 (4th Cir. 1968).
8 "It is important to note that it has not been suggested to us that
the 'income interest' was valueless. Rather the government concedes that a
present income interest (rather than a future interest, C. I. R. v. Disston,
supra) was in fact donated. The concession seems to us near fatal. The
government entertains two inconsistent positions-on one hand conceding that
a valuable right was donated and on the other contending that for tax
purposes the right is valueless." Id.
9 Certainly the problem of whether or not an interest is present or
future and the problem of valuation of an interest are both generally present
in the litigated cases. However, in this case, the problem of valuation stood
alone since the government had stipulated that a present interest had been
donated. Rosen v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 245, 247 (4th Cir. 1968).
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stipulated,"0 but whether such interests were capable of, or could
be properly valued by reference to actuarial tables."
Just because a present interest has been donated, it does not
necessarily follow that the gift tax exclusion specified in section
2503(b) will be available. More particularly, the present interest
must be capable of valuation.2 That is to say, $3,000 cannot be
excluded from the value of a gift unless that gift is somehow susceptible of valuation.' 3
Generally speaking, the value of the subject matter of a gift at
the date of transfer is considered the amount of the gift."4 Moreover, in the usual case, the value of a gift is determined by its market
value." The market value of property is generally the dollar figure
10 It is at least arguable that the government made a mistake in conceding
that a present interest was donated. It has been made clear that the gift
tax definition of a future interest need not be the same as the definition of
that term under local property law. United States v. Pelzer, 312 U.S.
399 402-03 (1941). Moreover, the definition of a future interest in the
regulations would seem to include gifts of interests such as those in the
Rosen case. "'Future interest' is a legal term, and includes . .. interests or
estates whether vested or contingent, and whether or not supported by a
particular interest or estate, which are limited to commence in use, possession
or enjoyment at some future date or time." Treas. Reg. § 25.2503 (a) (1958).
The interests in the Rosen case were certainly in all practicality limited to
"commence in use and possession or enjoyment at some future date or
time" since nothing to use, possess or enjoy was transferred at the time of
the gift. On the other hand, the gifts in the Rosen case might also seem to
fall within the definition of a present interest as defined in the regulations.
"An unrestricted right to the immediate use, possession, or enjoyment of
property or the income from property (such as a life estate or term certain)
is a present interest in property." Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(b) (1958). The
children might be said to have received "[ain unrestricted right to the immediate use, possession, or enjoyment of . . . the income from property
.... " (Emphasis added). This paradox seems to arise from the peculiar
facts in Rosen and the slight semantical disparities existing between paragraphs (a) and (b) of Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3 (1958). Perhaps a judicial
emphasis on the present enjoyment aspects of the definitions used in Treas.
Reg. § 25.2503-3(a) (b) would avoid the confusion.
" The United States Government incorporated acturial tables into the
gift tax regulations in 1936. Since that time, these tables have been updated
and the actuarial tables presently set forth in Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-5 (f)
(1958) have enjoyed widespread and long-standing use. The tables set
forth in § 25.2512-5 (f) are to be used in valuation of the present value of
a gift or an annuity, life estate, remainder, or reversion.
" Fischer v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 574, 577 (3rd Cir. 1961).
'3Riter v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 301, 303 (1944). The difficulty of
valuation is probably one of the reasons that the gift tax exclusion is restricted to present interests. 51 Marq. L. Rev. 332, 334 (1968).
,4Morgan v. Commissioner, 353 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 918 (1966).
15 The value of most
gifts is determined by ascertaining their market
value at the date of the gift. Hipp v. United States, 215 F. Supp. 222
(W.D.S.C. 1962).
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at which "such property would change hands between a willing
buyer and a willing seller."'" However, where as in the instant case,
the subject matter of the gifts (the income interests in the trusts) is
not such property as is sold on the market, some other method of
valuation must be found. The method prescribed by the regulations
seemed the logical alternative to the Rosens."'
Section 25.2512-5 of the gift tax regulations provides for the
valuation of terms for years by reference to tables of actuarial
factors.'" Moreover, the use of such tables is said to be justified
where there is an element of speculation in the valuation and where
the use of such tables is actuarily sound.' 9
On the other hand, it is clear that the value of such an interest
cannot be unreasonably uncertain." The uncertainty of valuation of
the income interest of a trust has often been held reason enough
to deny the taxpayer the gift tax exclusion. However, the cases
so holding are all readily distinguishable from the Rosen case. 2'
16 Market value is defined in the Treasury Regulations as follows: "The
value of the property is the price at which such property would change
hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any
compulsion to buy or sell, and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant
facts." Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1. For application of this rule see O'Malley
v. Ames 197 F.2d 256, 257 (8th Cir. 1952); Arc Realty Company v. Commissioner, 295 F.2d 98, 103 (8th Cir. 1961).
"'See Hipp v. U. S., 215 F. Supp. 222, 228 (W.D.S.C. 1962).
"8 Note that the Rosens used the wrong table. Treas. Reg. § 25.25125(2)(1958) provides in pertinent part that "[t]he present value of an
annuity, life estate, remainder or reversion determined under this section
which is dependent on the continuation or termination of the life of one
person is computed by the use of Table I in paragraph (f) of this section.
The present value of an annuity, term for years, remainder or reversion
dependent on a term certain is computed by the use of Table II in paragraph
(f)." The Rosens used Table I to value the income interest. They should
have used Table II. The interests of the beneficiaries of the Rosen trusts
were dependent upon a term certain not upon a life estate. However, the
fact that the taxpayer used the wrong table was not considered by the court,
and the basic issue decided was not which Table could be used but whether
resort 9 to any actuarial Table could be had.
1 Hipp v. U. S., 215 F. Supp. 222, 228 (W.D.S.C. 1962), where the
Court said: "mhe Court is convinced that any valuation of the income
interest would be little better than a guess. In such a case it is clear that
the method
prescribed by the regulation should be used."
20
This is axiomatic. See Fischer v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 574 (3rd

Cir. 1961).

21For example, in Funkhouser v. Commissioner, 275 F.2d 245 (4th
Cir. 1959), the trustees were given absolute discretion to invade the corpus
of the trust to the extent they deemed necessary to provide for any emergency
illness of the beneficiaries or their immediate families. Therefore, no
beneficiary had an unqualified right to receive income for any ascertainable
period of time. Because of the powers of invasion given the trustees, there
was no certainty as to the duration or amount of the corpus.
The beneficiary's income interest was contingent on the trustee's
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In all of the cases denying the exclusion there was no certainty as to
either the duration of the income interest or the amount of the corpus.
Specifically, either the length of time the beneficiary was to receive
the income was indefinite or the amount of property in the corpus of
the trust was subject to invasion. The income interests in the Rosen
trusts were not so infirmed. The income interests in the Rosen
trusts were somewhat speculative in nature. Certainly much of
their value depended upon future contingencies, but this only made
the problem of valuation difficult. The income beneficiaries under
each of the Rosen trusts had an unqualified right to income for a
definite period and no person had the power to destroy the right to
receive such income by an invasion of the corpus. Therefore, while
the values of the income interests in the Rosen trusts were somewhat uncertain, it was the certainty as to duration of interest and
certainty as to amount of corpus which distinguished them from
the cases cited for the government and made resort to the tables of
Treasury Regulation § 25.2512(f) actuarily sound.
Joseph R. Goodwin
Erwin Conrad

INFANTS-NEGLIGENCE-STANDARD

OF CARE

Defendant, an eleven-year-old boy, was playing golf with his
mother and two other adults. The plaintiff, about 150 yards away
and in plain view, was struck by a golf ball driven by the defendant.
The defendant had been playing golf two to three times a week during the season for the past two years, and in view of this, the trial
court charged the jury that the infant was to be held to the adult
discretion until mortgages and encumbrances against the trust property
were discharged in full in the case of Commissioner v. Brandegee, 123 F.2d
58 (1st Cir. 1941).
In Fischer v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 574 (3rd Cir. 1961), the settlor
and trustees had the power to invade the principal to make loans, and the
beneficiary's interest in this trust was subject to being cut off by any
attempt at alienation on his part or by his becoming bankrupt.
In La Fortune v. Commissioner, 263 F.2d 186 (10th Cir. 1958), the
trustee had the power in his discretion to terminate the trust at any time
and in Vogel v. United States, 42 F. Supp. 103

(D. Mass 1941),

the

trustees had the power to alter or amend the trust instrument in whole or
in part at any time and to change beneficiaries or adjust the beneficiary's
share under the trust. See also Herrman v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 440
(5th Cir. 1956); Riter v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 301 (1944); Geller v.
Commissioner, 9 T.C. 484 (1947).
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